Official title: Executive Summary and Principal Conclusions
In brief
- De Silva found that the threshold for a finding of collusion was met.
- He was left in “significant doubt” whether the UDA would have murdered Pat Finucane in February 1989 without the involvement of elements of the state.
- He found no “over-arching State conspiracy” and no evidence that ministers knew of the murder in advance.
- He found that senior Army officers lied to criminal investigators and that the RUC Special Branch obstructed the investigation.
What the summary does
The executive summary condenses the 25 chapters into about 20 pages and sets out the review's principal conclusions in numbered paragraphs. Most press coverage on 12 December 2012 was based on it, and it is the part of the report quoted most often, sometimes inaccurately.
The remit and method
The summary restates the terms of reference: to produce a full public account of any involvement by the Army, the RUC, the Security Service or any other part of the UK Government in the murder. De Silva explains that he examined the evidence afresh rather than treating earlier findings as binding. The review had no statutory powers of compulsion, but he reports that he was given access to the material he sought.
The context findings
- Information flowing to loyalists. The summary quotes a 1985 Security Service assessment that 85% of the UDA's "intelligence" originated from sources within the security forces, and says the proportion was probably largely unchanged by February 1989. (Chapter 11)
- Brian Nelson. The Army agent inside the UDA is linked to at least four murders and ten attempted murders after his re-recruitment, and the review found only a handful of cases where his information was used to stop attacks. (Chapters 6–8)
- Failure to warn. RUC Special Branch did not act on threats to Finucane, going back to 1981, which the summary finds inconsistent with the state's duty to protect life. (Chapter 16)
- Douglas Hogg's remarks. The minister's comments in January 1989 rested on an RUC briefing; de Silva found they could increase the vulnerability of defence solicitors but that Hogg did not intend that. (Chapter 14)
- Propaganda. Security Service propaganda initiatives came to include Finucane and were stopped; no political clearance had been sought. (Chapter 15)
The murder
The summary concludes that William Stobie, an RUC Special Branch agent, supplied a weapon used in the murder and that proper use of his information before the attack could have prevented it. It finds that Nelson, as the UDA's intelligence officer, was involved in targeting. Weighing these strands together, de Silva says he was left in "significant doubt" whether the UDA would have murdered Finucane in February 1989 without the involvement of elements of the state.
After the murder
The summary finds deliberate obstruction of the first Stevens investigation by the Army and RUC Special Branch, and that senior Army officers "deliberately lied to criminal investigators". It records that Ken Barrett was recruited as a Special Branch agent in 1991 rather than prosecuted. (Chapters 23–24)
Ministers and the overall conclusion
De Silva found "no evidence whatsoever" that any minister knew of the murder in advance, but criticised the absence of a proper framework for agent handling and found that ministers had been misled about Nelson. His overall conclusion is that the threshold for collusion was met, while there was no "over-arching State conspiracy" to murder Pat Finucane. (Chapter 25)
How it was received
The Prime Minister accepted the findings and apologised in the Commons the same day. The Finucane family rejected the review as inadequate and continued to seek a public inquiry. Some academic critics argued the summary understated institutional responsibility; others noted that its findings went further than any earlier official account.
Questions
Does the summary say the state killed Pat Finucane?
No. It says the UDA carried out the murder and that there was no over-arching state conspiracy. It also says that a series of positive actions by employees of the state actively furthered and facilitated the murder, and that the threshold for collusion was met.
Where does the 85% figure come from?
It comes from a 1985 Security Service assessment, quoted in the summary, that 85% of the UDA's intelligence originated from sources within the security forces. De Silva said he believed the proportion was largely unchanged by 1989.