Official title: The response of the RUC to threat intelligence
What this chapter covers
Chapter 9 looks at how the RUC handled intelligence that loyalist paramilitaries were planning to attack particular people, in general rather than in the Finucane case alone, which follows in chapter 16.
Key findings
The executive summary records de Silva's finding that, in a series of planned UDA attacks known about in advance, "nothing was done by the RUC to seek to prevent these attacks". He considers how threat warnings were supposed to work, what the policy was on telling people they were at risk, and how far Special Branch's control over intelligence affected whether action was taken.
Why it matters
The chapter establishes a pattern. When de Silva turns to the specific threats against Pat Finucane, he treats the failure to warn him as part of a wider problem rather than a single lapse. That pattern is also why the report discusses the state's duty under Article 2 of the European Convention to take reasonable steps to protect people whose lives it knows are at real risk.