Official title: The response to threat intelligence relating to Patrick Finucane
In brief
- UDA plots against Finucane in 1981, 1985 and 1988–89 were known to RUC Special Branch and/or the Security Service.
- No steps were taken to warn him.
What this chapter covers
Chapter 16 examines every piece of intelligence suggesting that loyalists were planning to attack Pat Finucane, and what was done with it.
Key findings
- The review identified UDA plots against Finucane known to RUC Special Branch and/or the Security Service in 1981, 1985 and 1988–89.
- In 1981 RUC Special Branch took no action to warn him. De Silva found this "wholly inconsistent with" the state's obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention.
- In December 1988 the Security Service received information about a potentially serious threat to Finucane's life. De Silva held the Service responsible for the failure to act on it; no steps were taken to warn him.
- The Prime Minister quoted the report's conclusion that "they took no action whatsoever to act on the threat intelligence".
Why it matters
These findings are among the most direct in the report. They do not depend on what the agents did or intended: the state had warnings and did not pass them on. They underpin the human-rights arguments later considered by the courts.