Official title: The flow of information from members of the security forces to the UDA
In brief
- A 1985 Security Service assessment estimated that 85% of UDA intelligence came from within the security forces.
- The chapter examines leaks by individual soldiers and police, and weaknesses in UDR vetting.
What this chapter covers
Chapter 11 examines how information from the security forces reached loyalist paramilitaries: photomontages, files and personal details of suspected republicans passed on by individual soldiers and police officers, particularly in the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited Army regiment.
Key findings
- The executive summary quotes a 1985 Security Service assessment that 85% of the UDA's "intelligence" originated from sources within the security forces. De Silva believed the proportion remained largely unchanged by the time of the murder in 1989.
- The review examined a large sample of leaks to the UDA in Belfast between 1987 and 1989.
- The chapter discusses weaknesses in vetting UDR recruits, including cases where applicants with adverse police reports were enlisted, and incidents such as the theft of a UDR briefing video.
- The Prime Minister described the report's account of "extensive 'leaks' of security force information to the UDA" in his statement.
Why it matters
This chapter explains why loyalist groups were able to target people at all. It is also one of the chapters most often quoted, because the 85% figure is so stark. When citing it, note that it is the Security Service's own 1985 estimate as reported by de Silva, not a figure he calculated.